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Childhood unpredictability and harshness are associated with patterns of psychology and 
behavior that enable individuals to make the most of adverse environments. The current research 
assessed effects of childhood unpredictability and harshness on individual differences in 
sacrificial moral decision making. Six studies (N=1,503) supported the hypothesis that childhood 
unpredictability, but not harshness, would be associated with fewer decisions to reject harm 
(consistent with deontological ethics) and to maximize overall outcomes (consistent with 
utilitarian ethics). These associations were not moderated by perceptions of current 
environmental unpredictability (Studies 3a and 3b) and were robust to potential confounds 
(religiosity, political conservativism, Big-5 personality traits, and social desirability; Study 5). 
The associations between childhood unpredictability and lower deontological and utilitarian 
tendencies were statistically mediated by low levels of empathic concern and poor-quality social 
relationships (Study 4). Findings are consistent with the possibility that early calibration to 
ecological unpredictability, but not harshness, undermines other-oriented psychological 
processes which, in turn, reduce moral concerns about harm and consequences for other people.  
Keywords: childhood unpredictability, childhood harshness, behavioral ecology, moral 




Humans display remarkable flexibility, responding adaptively to the challenges and 
opportunities afforded by their ecologies (Neuberg et al., 2010; Pigliucci, 2005; West-Eberhard, 
1989). Two crucial ecological affordances that influence a range of cognitive and behavioral 
processes across the lifespan involve the extent to which one’s early childhood environment is 
unpredictable (i.e., erratic and uncertain) and harsh (i.e., lacking in resources, characterized by 
high mortality and morbidity). Exposure to unpredictable and harsh environments in childhood 
has been implicated in a range of long-term outcomes in domains as far-reaching as close 
relationships, economic decisions, and health (e.g., Doom et al., 2016; Mittal & Griskevicius, 
2014; Szepsenwol et al., 2019; for review, see Pepper & Nettle, 2017). Yet, little is known about 
the implications of unpredictability and harshness on a central aspect of social life: morality. The 
current work investigated links between early developmental exposure to environmental 
unpredictability and harshness and individual differences in decision making on sacrificial moral 
dilemmas that pit a desire to avoid causing harm against a desire to maximize others’ overall 
wellbeing. 
Childhood unpredictability is associated with individual differences and psychological 
processes characterized by a focus on the present at the cost of future consequences and on the 
self at the cost of others (e.g., Belsky et al., 2012; Doom et al., 2016; Jonason et al., 2016; 
Simpson et al., 2012; Young et al., 2018). Hence, in the context of sacrificial moral dilemmas, 
people exposed to relatively unpredictable (versus predictable) childhood ecologies may be less 
likely to concern themselves with avoiding harm to other people and also less likely to strive to 
maximize people’s overall wellbeing. Although some work suggests that, like unpredictability, 
childhood harshness predicts a focus on the present at the cost of future consequences (e.g., 
Griskevicius et al., 2011; Mittal & Griskevicius, 2014), other work suggests that harshness 
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encourages interdependence and consideration of the wellbeing of others (e.g., Fiske & Markus, 
2012; Lamont, 2000; Markus et al., 2004). Harshness, then, may not be systematically associated 
with moral dilemma decision making. Therefore, the overarching prediction guiding the current 
investigation was that unpredictability, but not harshness, would be associated with weak 
tendencies to reject harm and maximize outcomes in sacrificial moral dilemmas. We tested this 
hypothesis in six studies.  
Behavioral Ecology: Childhood Unpredictability and Harshness 
Recent advances in behavioral ecology provide an overarching theoretical perspective 
useful for understanding the effects of childhood ecological variables (e.g., Ellis & Del Giudice, 
2019; Pepper & Nettle, 2017; Sng et al., 2018). This perspective suggests that affordances 
encountered early in life calibrate psychological processes in an adaptive manner.1 That is, early 
in development, people learn to behave in a way that is likely to maximize their reproductive 
fitness in the current environment and that learning processes sets the stage for patterns of 
behavior throughout the lifespan. Indeed, evidence suggests that early childhood environments 
fundamentally shape the way people navigate tradeoffs (e.g., between mating and parenting) in a 
way that helps them make the most of its limited bioenergetic resources (Belsky et al., 1991; 
Ellis et al., 2009).  
Two key elements of early childhood environments are unpredictability and harshness 
(Brumbach, Figueredo, & Ellis, 2009). Unpredictability denotes the extent to which an 
environment entails erratic or uncertain fluctuations in the presence of threat and/or the 
availability of resources (Belsky et al., 1991). Harshness denotes the rates of morbidity-mortality 
 
1It should be noted that, consistent with evolutionary perspectives, we use the term adaptive to mean reproductive 
fitness-enhancing, rather than to describe behaviors as desirable in a proximate psychological or social sense. 
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in an organism’s environment, largely based on a lack of resources by which to survive; for 
humans, harshness is closely related to socioeconomic status (SES; Belsky et al., 1991).  
Childhood exposure to unpredictability, in particular, has been linked to a range of 
adaptively calibrated outcomes in adulthood that reflect a focus on the self (versus others) and on 
the present (versus the future; e.g., Doom et al., 2016; Simpson et al., 2012; Young et al., 2018). 
Exposure to unpredictable environments suggests that the future is relatively uncertain. 
Consequently, childhood unpredictability signals that it would be adaptive to invest primarily in 
short-term (rather than long-term) biological processes and social/familial relationships (see 
Pepper & Nettle, 2017, for a review of the Behavioral Constellation of Deprivation). In contrast, 
exposure to more predictable environments in childhood suggests that the future is relatively 
certain and that one can expect a return on investing in long-term biological growth and 
relationships. For example, early unpredictability is associated with younger age at menarche, 
sexual debut, first birth, first marriage, and mortality (Chisholm et al., 2005; Xu et al., 2018). 
Moreover, childhood unpredictability, but not harshness, has been associated with risk taking 
and risky sexual behavior (Belsky et al., 2012; Simpson et al., 2012). 
 Unpredictability, but not harshness, prepares the person to accomplish goals and 
overcome obstacles without support from others, even to the extent of viewing social partners as 
untrustworthy (Wu et al., 2017) and as a means to an end (e.g., Jonason et al., 2016). For 
example, unpredictability has been shown to predict greed (Chen, 2018) as well as 
Machiavellianism and narcissism, whereas harshness has been linked to lower levels of those 
(Jonason et al., 2016). In extreme cases, unpredictability (but not harshness) predicts a tendency 
to engage in interpersonal violence (Barbaro & Shackelford, 2019; Doom et al., 2016; 
Szepsenwol et al., 2019). Given the essentially social other-focused nature of moral decision 
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making, we thus expected childhood unpredictability to be associated with less other-focused 
moral decision making, both when it comes to individual and overall wellbeing.  
Predictions for how childhood harshness shapes moral decision making are less clear. As 
in unpredictable environments, harsh environments may encourage impatience and risk taking to 
obtain resources now versus later (e.g., Griskevicius et al., 2011; Mittal & Griskevicius, 2014). 
Such work implies that, like unpredictability, harshness might be associated with less other-
focused moral decisions. Some preliminary support for this prediction is provided by work with 
the Prosocial Moral Reasoning task (PROM; Zhu et al., 2018). The PROM entails reading stories 
and deciding how the protagonist should behave when facing a moral decision and why she 
should behave that way (Carlo et al., 1992). The reasons provided to participants track whether 
they (a) desire to help others and (b) prefer self-focused versus other-focused reasons for helping 
(Eisenberg, 1986). People who experienced more, versus less, unpredictable and harsh 
childhoods made more selfish decisions, and this was accounted for by reduced future-oriented 
planning and reduced emotional attachment (Zhu et al., 2018). Therefore, it is plausible that 
childhood unpredictability and harshness have similar impacts on sacrificial decisions.  
 However, there is reason to think that unpredictable and harsh environments beget 
different patterns of moral decision making. Crucially, their downstream effects on social life 
diverge: unlike an unpredictable ecology, a harsh ecology renders maladaptive behaviors that 
benefit the self at the cost of others. Harsh but predictable environments (i.e., those consistently 
lacking in resources) require investment in social relationships that are enduring and highly 
interdependent. Enduring relationships provide a social support network that help people work 
through times of hardship (e.g., Sugiyama, 2004), which may be chronic in harsher ecologies. 
Indeed, people from lower socioeconomic environments spend more time with family and 
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provide more hands-on caregiving to group members (e.g., Markus et al., 2004). Moreover, 
childhood harshness has been associated with norms of attending and responding to others’ 
needs, connecting to others, and being part of a community (Fiske & Markus, 2012; Lamont, 
2000). This is consistent with studies documenting high levels of social interdependence and 
prioritization of others among low-socioeconomic status individuals, who tend to lack resources 
and thus benefit from a consistent give-and-take of social support (Grossmann & Varnum, 2011; 
Stephens et al., 2007, 2011, 2012; see also Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Hence, we may expect 
that people whose early development occurred in a harsh (but predictable) ecology to be more 
other-focused in moral decision making.  
 In sum, although childhood unpredictability and harshness may both predict a focus on 
the now at the cost of the future, their downstream social effects are likely to diverge. Childhood 
unpredictability promotes less concern for others, whereas childhood harshness promotes more 
concern for others. Accordingly, we predicted that childhood unpredictability, but not harshness, 
would be associated with less other-focused moral decision making in scenarios that entail 
tradeoffs between harm and the greater good—i.e., moral dilemmas.   
Sacrificial Moral Dilemmas 
 Sacrificial moral dilemmas are ethical conundrums in which causing harm minimizes 
total suffering, such as the famous trolley dilemma in which killing one person will save five 
others (Foot, 1967). Theorists claim that decisions on sacrificial dilemmas align with two 
philosophical positions: accepting harm to maximize outcomes violates deontological ethics but 
upholds utilitarian ethics (e.g., Greene et al., 2004). Deontological ethics describe the morality 
of actions in terms of their intrinsic nature, so causing harm is wrong regardless of the 
consequences (Kant, 1785/1959). In contrast, utilitarian (or more broadly, consequentialist) 
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ethics describe the morality of actions in terms of their overall utility (consequences), so causing 
harm is acceptable if it improves wellbeing in aggregate (e.g., more lives are saved than lost; 
Mill, 1861/1998). Researchers may thus descriptively refer to dilemma decisions to avoid 
causing harm as deontological and to maximize outcomes as utilitarian, though lay people’s 
dilemma decisions are not necessarily driven by such philosophical ideals (see Kahane et al., 
2015; Conway et al., 2018).  
Dilemma responses reflect a confluence of cognitive and emotional psychological 
processes. Greene and colleagues (e.g., 2007, 2014) proposed a dual process model suggesting 
that emotional aversion to harming other people underpins decisions to reject causing harm, 
whereas cognitive deliberation about consequences underpins decisions to maximize outcomes.2  
Viewing harm as an inappropriate course of action, even when it would benefit countless people 
or save lives (consistent with deontological ethics), appears to partially result from negative 
emotional reactions to harm and emotional concern for others (e.g., Fleischmann et al., 2019). 
Indeed, deontological responding increases when individuals experience other-focused emotions 
(Strohminger et al., 2011) or vividly imagine harm (Bartels, 2008; Petrinovich & O’Neill, 1996). 
In contrast, deontological responding decreases when harm is trivialized or the emotional 
distance to victims increases (Petrinovich et al., 1993; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006), emotional 
processing is dampened (Patil & Siliani, 2014), or it is difficult to visualize the harm (Amit & 
Greene, 2012). Individual differences characterized by a lack of concern for others—lower moral 
identity, moral conviction about harm, and aversion to others’ suffering, and higher psychopathy, 
egoism, and willingness to commit ethical violations—predict less deontological dilemma 
 
2 An earlier ‘hard’ version of the dual-process model focused on response speed and efficiency was debunked (e.g., 
Koop, 2013), but evidence remains for this ‘soft’ version focused on affect/cognition (Skitka & Conway, 2018).  
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responding (Conway et al., 2018; Reynolds & Conway, 2018; Conway & Gawronski, 2013; 
Gawronski et al., 2017). 
Viewing harm that increases overall wellbeing (consistent with utilitarian ethics) as 
acceptable appears to emerge in part from processes that facilitate concern about and 
consideration of outcomes for the group. Utilitarian responding is positively associated with the 
motivation (e.g., Bartels, 2008; Nichols & Mallon, 2006) and capacity (e.g., Baron et al., 2012; 
Bartels, 2008; Moore et al., 2008; Rozyman et al., 2015) to reflect on how consequences will 
affect multiple other people. Moreover, utilitarian response tendencies are associated with 
concern for and willingness to act on behalf of the group (Conway et al., 2018a; Reynolds & 
Conway, 2018). Individual differences characterized by a lack of concern for others—lower 
moral identity, moral conviction about harm, and aversion to witnessing others’ suffering, and 
higher psychopathy, egoism, and willingness to commit ethical violations— also predict less 
utilitarian dilemma responding (Conway et al., 2018; Reynolds & Conway, 2018; Conway & 
Gawronski, 2013; Gawronski et al., 2017). Finally, some work finds that empathic concern 
contributes to utilitarian decisions that increase overall wellbeing and decrease overall suffering 
(e.g., Fleischman et al., 2019; Maranges et al., 2020a, 2020b).  
Childhood Unpredictability, Harshness, and Moral Dilemmas: Predictions 
  Deontological and utilitarian dilemma responses are guided predominantly by emotional 
concern for others and consideration of future consequences, particularly for the group, 
respectively. Moreover, both decisions to reject and accept harm are associated with tendencies 
to attend to and invest in the wellbeing of others. Childhood unpredictability (vs. predictability), 
is associated with traits and behaviors characterized by less consideration of future consequences 
for the self and the group as well as less concern for and investment in sustaining and protecting 
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long-term social relationships. Hence, we hypothesized that childhood unpredictability would be 
negatively associated with both deontological and utilitarian responses on moral dilemmas.  
The current investigation also focused on variables that might mediate the hypothesized 
relationship between childhood unpredictability and moral decisions. Prior work demonstrates 
that adaptive calibration to early unpredictability entails more less other-focused emotional and 
interpersonal processes—processes that also predict lower deontological response tendencies 
(e.g., Conway & Gawronski, 2013). For example, unpredictability has been associated with 
lower empathy, perspective taking, and support given to and received from close others, and 
higher levels of social detachment, antagonism, and psychopathy (e.g., Figueredo et al., 2007; 
Jonason et al., 2016, 2017; Zhu et al., 2018). Early ecological unpredictability is also associated 
with less concern for and investment in the future and the group, which predicts lower utilitarian 
response tendencies (e.g., Conway et al., 2018a; Reynolds & Conway, 2018). For instance, 
unpredictability has been associated with more risk taking and impulsivity (Doom et al., 2016) as 
well as less other-focused moral decision making (Zhu et al., 2018). Hence, we hypothesized that 
the association between childhood unpredictability and low levels of deontological and utilitarian 
responses on sacrificial moral dilemmas might be mediated by a lack of trust, emotional concern, 
and connectedness to other people.  
 Predictions for harshness were less clear than those for unpredictability. On one hand, 
effects of harshness sometimes are aligned with those of unpredictability. For example, in one 
investigation of moral decisions, both childhood unpredictability and harshness were associated 
with less other-focused decisions, and those associations were mediated through low levels of 
perspective taking and empathic concern (Zhu et al., 2018). This would suggest that, like 
unpredictability, harshness may be related to less deontological and utilitarian decision making. 
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On the other hand, research on low SES communities suggests that chronic experiences with 
resource scarcity in childhood result in high, rather than low, levels of empathy, 
interdependence, and investment in the group’s future (e.g., Stephens et al., 2012). This would 
suggest that harshness may be associated with relatively higher levels of deontological and 
utilitarian decisions. The current studies carefully disentangled unpredictability from harshness, 
and thus allowed us to adjudicate between these possible patterns associated with harshness. To 
test the relationships between unpredictability and harshness and both deontological and 
utilitarian dilemma responses simultaneously, we employed process dissociation (PD), which 
provides separate estimates of deontological and utilitarian response tendencies to moral 
dilemmas. (For additional background and details on PD, please see Supplemental Materials.) 
The Current Work 
 Across six studies, we tested the prediction that childhood unpredictability, but not  
harshness, will be associated with less harm-rejecting (deontological) and less outcome-
maximizing (utilitarian) responding on sacrificial moral dilemmas. In Study 1, we measured 
childhood unpredictability and childhood harshness and responses to twenty moral dilemmas. 
Study 2 entailed a replication and extension of the first study, including an extended measure of 
childhood harshness. In Studies 3a and 3b (preregistered), we tested whether the effect of 
childhood unpredictability on moral decision making might shift based on perceptions of current 
environmental unpredictability. In Study 4 (preregistered), we tested whether multiple candidate 
mediators—empathic control, general trust, belief in a dangerous world, and relationship 
network support quality—partially account for the relationships between childhood 
unpredictability and harm-avoiding (deontological) and outcome-maximizing (utilitarian) 
dilemma response tendencies. In Study 5 (preregistered), we employed novel, extended measures 
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of childhood harshness and unpredictability, including social and physical sources of 
unpredictability. Furthermore, Study 5 explored the role of potential confounds, including 
religiosity, conservatism, personality, and social desirability. Across all studies, we report all 
measures, conditions, and exclusions, and followed APA and our institution’s IRB ethical 
guidelines.3  
Study 1 
 Study 1 tested the prediction that childhood unpredictability, but not harshness, would be 
associated with less harm avoidance and outcome maximization across sacrificial moral 
dilemmas. 
Method 
 Participants. Power analysis indicated that a sample of 207 participants provides 90% 
power to detect effects of r = .20 (Faul et al., 2007), which is between a small and medium effect 
size and approximates a common effect size in the dilemma literature (e.g., Conway & 
Gawronski, 2013; Conway et al., 2018). Given high rates of attention check and dilemma 
completion failures and to increase our power, we planned a priori to collect data from at least 
350 people. We received responses from three hundred and sixty-one people via Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk in a single wave. We decided a priori to exclude participants who failed an 
attention check (n = 106; see Oppenheimer et al., 2009) or who failed to answer all dilemmas4 (n 
= 16, 15 of whom also failed the attention check). Our final sample included 254 individuals 
 
3IRB approval: Florida State University Institutional Review Board, Self-Control and Moral Decision Making 
2019.27154, Clarifying Difficult Judgments 2018.26256 
4Process dissociation calculations typically entail computing percentages out of 10 possible responses, so including 
participants who complete fewer than all dilemmas can result in calculation problems (see Conway & Gawronski, 
2013, Appendix B).  
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(120 females, 132 males, 2 other; Mage = 36.02, SD = 11.05; 194 White, 38 Black, 16 Hispanic or 
Latino, 8 Native American, 3 Asian, 2 Pacific Islander).  
 Procedure and materials. After providing consent, participants completed the moral 
dilemma battery and measures of childhood unpredictability and harshness before reporting 
demographics.5 
 Childhood unpredictability. Participants reported whether their childhood environments 
(i.e., before the age of 10) were characterized by unpredictability using a measure developed by 
Mittal et al. (2015). Participants rated the extent to which they agreed on a 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 7 (strongly agree) scale with 8 items, including My family life was generally inconsistent and 
unpredictable from day-to-day, My parent(s) frequently had arguments or fights with each other 
or other people in my childhood, My parents had a difficult divorce or separation during this 
time, People often moved in and out of my house on a pretty random basis, When I woke up, I 
often didn't know what could happen in my house that day, My family environment was often 
tense and on edge, Things were often chaotic in my house, and I had a hard time knowing what 
my parent(s) or other people in my house were going to say. We averaged scores across items 
and higher scores represent relatively more unpredictable childhood environments (M = 3.83, SD 
= 1.97, α = .96). 
Childhood harshness. Consistent with previous research (e.g., Belsky et al., 2010; 
Simpson et al., 2012), we used a measure of family income to index the harshness of 
participants’ childhood environment. Participants responded to the item Think back to your life 
when you were younger than 10. This time includes preschool, kindergarten, and the first few 
years of elementary school. What was your family's household income? with options (1) $15,000 
 
5In Studies 1, 2, and 3b we also examined how measures of life history strategy would relate to moral dilemma 
responses. See Supplemental Materials for these measures and analyses. 
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or less, (2) $15,001–$25,000, (3) $25,001–$35,000, (4) $35,001–$50,000, (5) $50,001–$75,000, 
(6) $75,001–$100,000, (7) $100,001–$150,000, and (8) $150,000 or more. This item was reverse 
coded, such that higher values correspond to harsher environments (M = 5.13, SD = 1.70). 
 Moral dilemma battery. Participants read and responded to a battery of 10 incongruent 
and 10 congruent moral dilemmas in a fixed random order (Conway & Gawronski, 2013; 
materials and syntax available on Open Science Framework). Each dilemma involved a scenario 
in which an action produces a harmful outcome, and participants indicated whether each action 
was appropriate (yes, I find this appropriate) or not (no, I find this inappropriate; Greene et al., 
2001). Incongruent dilemmas describe scenarios in which causing harm maximizes overall 
outcomes, as in conventional sacrificial dilemmas (e.g., Koenigs et al., 2007). For example, 
participants considered cases in which smothering a crying baby saves the lives of many hiding 
villagers, a vaccine helps many more than it hurts, and a border guard must decide whether to 
shoot a traveler before he blows up a checkpoint. In such cases, harm is relatively easy to justify 
on utilitarian ethical grounds (e.g., killing one target saves multiple lives). Yet, harm remains 
impermissible according to deontological ethics. Hence, rejecting harm (deontological) and 
maximizing outcomes (utilitarian) are incongruent response tendencies that motivate opposing 
judgments.  
 PD analyses additionally assess responses to the congruent counterpart to each 
incongruent dilemma. Congruent dilemmas describe identical harmful actions, but the outcome 
of harm is less beneficial overall. For example, the congruent version of the crying baby 
dilemmas entails killing a baby to save villagers from manual labor, the congruent vaccine 
dilemma entails administering a deadly vaccine to prevent a fairly mild flu, and the congruent 
border crossing entails shooting a traveler to prevent him from working illegally in one’s county. 
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Such harm is relatively difficult to justify on utilitarian grounds (e.g., killing one person prevents 
only nonlethal harm), so concerns about rejecting harm and maximizing outcomes are now 
congruent, leading to the same response. Importantly, there are still amoral or immoral reasons to 
accept harm on congruent dilemmas, such as sadism or self-interest (e.g., Conway et al., 2018).  
 By applying responses to both incongruent and congruent dilemmas to a processing tree, 
researchers can algebraically represent the pathways leading to each response and calculate a  
Utilitarian parameter (tendency to maximize outcomes regardless of causing harm) and a 
Deontological parameter (tendency to reject harm regardless of outcomes). This method 
improves upon use of only conventional judgments (i.e., examining the proportion of harm 
acceptance for incongruent dilemmas only), which conflate harm avoidance and outcome 
maximization as inversely related rather than separable. For details on Process Dissociation, 
parameter calculation, and conventional responses, please see Supplemental Materials.  
Demographics and control variables. Participants reported their age, gender, and current 
family income (with the same response options of the childhood income measure, but not reverse 
coded, such that higher values indicate higher income, M = 4.40, SD = 1.63). 
Results  
 Data and syntax for all studies are available on the Open Science Framework. First, we 
tested our primary prediction that childhood unpredictability, but not harshness, would be 
negatively related to both the D and U parameters (see Table 1). Here and for all regression and 
mediation analyses, we standardized both PD parameters.  
Childhood unpredictability. As expected, unpredictability was negatively related to 
both parameters, such that people who experienced relatively unpredictable childhood 
environments less often rejected harm and maximized outcomes. These associations held when 
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controlling for childhood harshness, adult income, age, gender, and the other parameter: D 
parameter, b = -.20, SE = .03, t(243) = -6.31, p < .001, CI95[-.258, -.135], and U parameter, b = -
.16, SE = .03, t(243) = -4.60, p < .001, CI95[-.226, -.091].  
Childhood harshness. Harshness was not related to either PD parameter. These null 
associations held when controlling for childhood unpredictability, adult income, age, gender, and 
the other parameter: D parameter, b = .02, SE = .04, t(243) = .56, p = .579, CI95[-.052, .093], and 
U parameter, b = .02, SE = .04, t(243) = .58, p = .560, CI95[-.055, .101].  
Discussion  
 This study is the first to examine links between childhood unpredictability, harshness, 
and decision making on sacrificial moral dilemmas. As expected, people who experienced a 
relatively unpredictable childhood environment found harmful actions more acceptable (i.e., less 
deontological responding) and were less concerned about increasing multiple others’ wellbeing 
(i.e., less utilitarian responding). Childhood harshness was unrelated to moral dilemma decision 
making—whether people’s childhoods were characterized by resource scarcity versus abundance 
had no bearing on their responses to moral dilemmas. Perhaps, though, our limited measure of 
harshness (a single item measure of childhood family income) obscured some relationship 
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2. Deontology PD 
Parameter 
 




 -.39*** -.46*** —     
4.  Childhood 
Harshness  
 
-.03 .03 .12* —    
5. Adult  
Income 
 
.08 -.01 -.17** -.43***        —   
6. Gender  
   (f=1, m=2) 
 
-.11† -.15* .04 .08 .02        —  




Study 2 entailed a replication of Study 1 with the addition of a longer measure of 
harshness (Young et al., 2018).  
Method 
Participants. Given the high attention check failure rate of Study 1, we sought to 
increase our sample size for this replication study. We collected data from three hundred and 
ninety-six people total via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (n = 239) and at a large southeastern 
public university (n = 157) in a single wave. As before, we decided a priori to exclude 
participants who failed an attention check (n = 135; Oppenheimer et al., 2009) or who failed to 
answer all dilemmas (n = 19, all of whom also failed the attention check). Our final sample 
included 261 individuals (148 females, 110 males, 3 other; Mage = 28.29, SD = 10.22; 206 White, 
28 Black, 28 Hispanic or Latino, 7 Native American, 6 Asian, 5 Pacific Islander, 1 Middle 
Eastern, 1 Indian, 1 ‘multi’).  
Procedure and materials. After providing consent, participants completed the same PD 
moral dilemma battery and childhood unpredictability measure from Study 1 (M = 3.01, SD = 
1.84, α = .94). Participants also reported more extensive details about the harshness of their 
childhood environment by reporting their socioeconomic status (SES): Participants responded to 
the same item asking about childhood family income as in Study 1, which was reverse coded 
such that higher scores indicate harsher environments (i.e., fewer resources; M = 4.02, SD = 
1.96). Additionally, participants rated the extent to which they agreed with three items on a scale 
from -3 (strongly disagree) to +3 (strongly disagree): My family usually had enough money for 
things when I was growing up, I grew up in a relatively wealthy neighborhood, and I felt 
relatively wealthy compared with other kids in my school (Mittal et al., 2015, Young et al., 
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2018). We converted these responses to 1-7 and reversed them, such that higher scores indicated 
harsher environments (M = 3.28, SD = 1.63). All four items were standardized and averaged to 
create a composite childhood harshness measure (SD = .86, α = .88). As in Study 1, participants 
also reported demographics and their current family income (M = 5.08, SD = 1.98). 
Results  
 First, we tested our primary predictions that childhood unpredictability, but not 
harshness, would be negatively related to the D and U parameters (see Table 2).  
Childhood unpredictability. As expected, and replicating Study 1, unpredictability was 
negatively related to both PD parameters, such that people who experienced relatively 
unpredictable childhood environments were less likely to both reject harm and maximize 
outcomes. These associations held when controlling for childhood harshness, adult income, age, 
gender, and the other parameter: D parameter, b = -.14, SE = .04, t(248) = -3.69, p < .001, CI95[-
.207, -.063], and U parameter, b = -.18, SE = .04, t(248) = -5.14, p < .001, CI95[-.251, -.112].  
Childhood harshness. Replicating Study 1, harshness was not related to either PD 
parameter. These null associations held when controlling for childhood unpredictability, adult 
income, age, gender, and the other parameter: D parameter, b = .09, SE = .08, t(248) = 1.09, p = 
.277, CI95[-.072, .250], and U parameter, b = .14, SE = .08, t(248) = 1.76, p = .079, CI95[-.017, 
.300]. 
Discussion 
 Study 2 replicated the link between childhood unpredictability and lower concerns about 
both rejecting harm and maximizing outcomes on sacrificial moral dilemmas. We also replicated 
the finding that childhood harshness was not associated with either dilemma response tendency. 
Together, the findings of Study 2 increased our confidence that early ecologies characterized by 
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unpredictability, but not harshness, are associated with individual differences in adult moral 
decision making. However, it remains unclear how current ecological unpredictability affects 
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Study 3 had two aims. First, we sought to again replicate the finding that childhood 
unpredictability, but not harshness, is associated with less utilitarian and deontological decision 
making on sacrificial moral dilemmas. Second, we examined whether current environmental 
unpredictability (operationalized as economic unpredictability) moderates these relationships. In 
prior work, current environmental unpredictability amplified the impact of childhood 
unpredictability (but not harshness), on measures of cognitive calibration to unpredictability 
(Mittal et al., 2015; Young et al., 2018). Hence, we expected that for people who experienced 
relatively unpredictable childhood environments, current unpredictability would lead to even 
lower levels of deontological and utilitarian response tendencies (i.e., an interaction). It was less 
clear whether such a manipulation would interact with childhood harshness, which failed to 
predict moral decision making in the two prior studies. Likewise, we did not have a strong 
prediction for the main effect of the current unpredictability manipulation on dilemma responses. 
We tested these predictions in two preregistered studies: Study 3a (aspredicted.org, #24314) and 
a more highly powered replication, Study 3b (aspredicted.org, #24967). 
Study 3a 
Method. 
Participants. An a priori power analysis indicated that for the predicted effect size f = .25 
(medium effect) for the interaction between current and childhood unpredictability, 287 people 
would be needed to reach 90% power (Faul et al., 2007). Given expected high rates of attention 
check failures, we decided to collect data from at least 350 people. We collected data from 376 
people via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk in a single wave. As preregistered, we decided a priori to 
exclude participants who failed (a) an attention check (n = 30; Oppenheimer et al., 2009), (b) to 
answer all dilemmas (n = 0), or (c) to respond appropriately to the manipulation check (i.e., 
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reporting inaccurate information from the current unpredictability slide show; n = 30). Our final 
sample included 302 individuals (169 females, 132 males, 1 other; Mage = 36.94, SD = 11.60; 225 
White, 33 Black, 26 Hispanic or Latino, 28 Asian, 5 Native American, 1 Pacific Islander, 1 
‘mixed,’ 1 ‘Jewish/White’).  
 Procedure and materials. After providing consent, participants viewed a one minute 
slideshow and responded to the moral dilemma battery, which was interpolated with two 
manipulation checks/boosters. Then participants responded to the same measures of childhood 
unpredictability (M = 2.76, SD = 1.55, α = .93), childhood harshness (items standardized and 
combined, SD = .84, α = .86), and demographics, including adult income (M = 4.52, SD = 1.90), 
as in Study 2.  
 Current unpredictability manipulation. We employed a manipulation of unpredictability 
created and used in previous work (Young et al., 2018). We randomly assigned participants to 
view one of two slideshows ostensibly reporting news headlines from the New York Times. Each 
slideshow was 60 seconds long, containing 6 slides presented for 10 seconds each. One show 
was designed to induce a sense of economic unpredictability. The control condition was designed 
to induce concerns about issues with modern computer technology. Both slideshows included a 
title page followed by five images coupled with a single sentence of information and were 
matched on negativity. The economic unpredictability slideshow contained images of and 
information about a worsening and unpredictable economy, whereas the control slideshow 
contained images of and information about failures of modern computer technology. See 
Supplemental Materials for slides.  
23 
 
Manipulation check and booster. After the 7th and 14th moral dilemmas of the moral 
dilemma battery, participants reported what information they remembered from the slide show in 
an open response. This served as our manipulation check and also to boost the manipulation. 
Results. First, we tested our predictions that childhood unpredictability is negatively 
related to both the U and D parameters and that current unpredictability will amplify these 
effects. Second, we examined how childhood harshness would relate to the parameters and 
explored whether any associations would vary by current unpredictability.  
Childhood unpredictability. As expected, and replicating Studies 1 and 2, 
unpredictability was negatively related to both parameters, such that people who experienced 
relatively unpredictable childhood environments less often maximized outcomes and avoided 
harm (see Table 3a). When controlling for childhood harshness, adult income, age, gender, and 
the other parameter, the association between childhood unpredictability remained significant for 
the U parameter and become marginal for the D parameter: U parameter, b = -.12, SE = .04, 
t(295) = -2.90, p = .004, CI95[-.197, -.038], and D parameter, b = -.08, SE = .04, t(295) = -1.90, p 
= .059, CI95[-.154, .003]. 
Next, we tested whether childhood unpredictability interacted with the current 
unpredictability manipulation to predict the U and D parameters. In two separate regression 
analyses, we regressed the U parameter or D parameter onto childhood unpredictability 
(centered), condition (technology fails/control=0, current unpredictability/experimental=1), and 
their interaction, controlling for the other parameter. The interaction was not significant for 
either parameter: U parameter, b = -.04, SE = .08, t(297) = -0.50, p = .614, CI95[-.185, .109]; D 
parameter, b = -.11, SE = .07, t(297) = -1.42, p = .158, CI95[-.251, .041]. As we preregistered, we 
reran the analyses controlling for not only the other parameter, but also childhood harshness, 
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adult income, age, and gender. For the U parameter, the interaction remained nonsignificant, b = 
-.03, SE = .07, t(293) = -0.34, p = .734, CI95[-.171, .120]. For the D parameter, the interaction 
was not significant but marginal, b = -.12, SE = .07, t(293) = -1.66, p = .098, CI95[-.261, .022].
6  
The economic unpredictability manipulation did not exert a main effect on either the U or 
D parameter: U parameter, b = -.15, SE = .12, t(297) = -1.32, p = .189, CI95[-.378, .075]; D 
parameter, b = -.14, SE = .12, t(297) = -1.18, p = .239, CI95[-.462, .091]. This null effect held 
when controlling childhood harshness, adult income, age, gender, and the other parameter: U 
parameter, b = -.18, SE = .11, t(293) = -1.59, p = .114, CI95[-.404, .043]; D parameter, b = -.11, 
SE = .11, t(293) = -1.00, p = .318, CI95[-.331, .108].  
Childhood harshness. Consistent with the prior two studies, childhood harshness was not 
associated with the D parameter. This held when controlling for childhood unpredictability, adult 
income, age, gender, and the other parameter, b = .07, SE = .08, t(295) = 0.87, p = .383, CI95[-
.083, .216]. However, childhood harshness was associated with the U parameter, such that 
people who experienced relatively harsher (compared with less harsh) childhoods were more 
likely to maximize outcomes across moral dilemmas. This held when controlling for childhood 
unpredictability, adult income, age, gender, and the other parameter, b = .20, SE = .08, t(295) = 
2.60, p = .010, CI95[.049, .351].  
 Next, we also explored whether the current economic unpredictability manipulation 
interacted with childhood harshness to predict moral dilemma decision making. In two separate 
regression analyses, we regressed the U parameter or D parameter onto childhood harshness 
 
6Because this interaction was of primary interest, we probed it. However, we caution the reader to keep in mind that 
it was not statistically different from zero. The interaction indicated that current economic unpredictability (vs. 
control condition) led to marginally lower harm aversion across moral dilemmas for people who experienced highly 
unpredictable childhood environments (i.e., 1 SD above the mean of unpredictability), b = -.30, SE = .16, t(293) = -
1.89, p = .060, CI95[-.602, .012], but not for people who experienced highly predictable childhood environments 
(i.e., 1 SD below the mean of unpredictability), b = .07, SE = .16, t(293) = 0.46, p = .649, CI95[-.239, .383]. 
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(standardized), condition (technology fails/control=0, current unpredictability/experimental=1), 
and their interaction, controlling for the other parameter. The interaction was not significant for 
either parameter: U parameter, b = -.22, SE = .14, t(297) = -1.59, p = .113, CI95[-.484, .052]; D 
parameter, b = -.16, SE = .14, t(297) = -1.14, p = .257, CI95[-.428, .115]. This pattern of results 
held when controlling for not only the other parameter, but also childhood unpredictability, adult 
income, age, and gender: U parameter, b = -.20, SE = .14, t(293) = -1.50, p = .134, CI95[-.470, 
.063]; D parameter, b = -.08, SE = .13, t(293) = -0.60, p = .552, CI95[-.343, .184]. 
 Discussion. Study 3a replicated Studies 1 and 2, demonstrating a link between childhood 
unpredictability and less deontological and utilitarian responding to sacrificial moral dilemmas: 
People who experienced more unpredictable environments as children were less likely to reject 
harm and maximize outcomes. As in prior studies, childhood harshness was not associated with 
deontological response tendencies. New to this study, childhood harshness predicted more 
utilitarian decision making, suggesting that people whose early ecologies were characterized by 
resource scarcity were more (not less) sensitive to opportunities to improve outcomes for other 
people. 
Contrary to expectations, the unpredictability of the present environment did not amplify 
the relationship between childhood unpredictability and moral dilemma response tendencies. 
Likewise, the current unpredictability manipulation did not moderate links between childhood 
harshness and deontological or utilitarian response tendencies. However, this study may have 
been underpowered to detect effects. Hence, to ensure that support for the null hypothesis was 
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 We conducted a preregistered replication of Study 3a (aspredicted.org, #24967) with a 
larger sample to ensure adequate power, given smaller effect sizes than initially expected.  
Method. 
Participants. For an adjusted (based on Study 3a) predicted effect size f = .17 (between a 
small and medium effect) for an interaction, power analyses indicated that 483 people provided 
90% power (Faul et al., 2007). Given expected high rates of attention check failures, we decided 
to collect data from at least 550 people in a single wave. We collected data from six hundred and 
fifty-eight people via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. As preregistered, we decided a priori to 
exclude participants who failed (a) an attention check (n = 187; Oppenheimer et al., 2009), (b) to 
answer all dilemmas (n = 12), or (c) to respond appropriately to the manipulation check (n = 79). 
Our final sample included 436 individuals, which afforded about 80% power to detect small to 
medium interaction effects (169 females, 132 males, 1 other; Mage = 30.87, SD = 10.77; 299 
White, 57 Hispanic or Latino, 53 Black, 37 Asian, 12 Native American, 2 Middle Eastern, 1 
Pacific Islander, 2 multiracial, 1 ‘other’).  
Procedure and materials. Study 3b was identical to Study 3a: participants watched the 
economic unpredictability manipulation slideshow and responded to the PD moral dilemma 
battery, the manipulation check/boosters, and measures of childhood unpredictability (M = 2.93, 
SD = 1.70, α = .93), childhood harshness (items standardized and combined, SD = .86, α = .88), 
and demographics, including adult income (M = 4.50, SD = 2.11). 
Results. First, we tested our predictions that childhood unpredictability is negatively 
related to both the U and D parameters and that current unpredictability will amplify these 
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effects. Second, we examined how childhood harshness related to the parameters and explored 
whether any associations would vary by current unpredictability.  
Childhood unpredictability. As expected, replicating Studies 1, 2, and 3a, 
unpredictability was negatively related to both PD parameters, such that people who experienced 
relatively unpredictable childhood environments less often avoided harm and maximized 
outcomes (see Table 3b). These associations held when controlling for childhood harshness, 
adult income, age, gender, and the other parameter: U parameter, b = -.07, SE = .03, t(429) = -
2.36, p = .019, CI95[-.128, -.012], and D parameter, b = -.06, SE = .03, t(429) = -2.12, p = .035, 
CI95[-.117, -.004].  
Next, we tested whether childhood unpredictability interacted with current 
unpredictability to predict the U and D parameters. In separate regression analyses, we regressed 
each parameter onto childhood unpredictability (centered), condition (technology fails/control=0, 
current unpredictability/experimental=1), and their interaction, controlling for the other 
parameter. The interaction was not significant for either parameter: U parameter, b = -.02, SE = 
.06, t(431) = -0.39, p = .700, CI95[-.130, .087]; D parameter, b = .03, SE = .06, t(431) = 0.60, p = 
.550, CI95[-.075, .141]. Results replicated in analyses controlling for not only the other 
parameter, but also childhood harshness, adult income, age, and gender: U parameter, b = -.03, 
SE = .06, t(427) = -0.45, p = .653, CI95[-.133, .084]; D parameter, b = .02, SE = .05, t(427) = 
0.30, p = .768, CI95[-.090, .121].  
As in Study 3a, the economic unpredictability manipulation did not exert a significant 
main effect on either the U or D parameter: U parameter, b = -.11, SE = .09, t(431) = -1.21, p = 
.225, CI95[-.297, .070]; D parameter, b = .17, SE = .09, t(431) = 1.87, p = .063, CI95[-.009, .357]. 
These null effects held when controlling for childhood harshness, adult income, age, gender, and 
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other parameter: U parameter, b = -.12, SE = .09, t(427) = -1.23, p = .219, CI95[-.299, .069]; D 
parameter, b = .12, SE = .09, t(447) = 1.29, p = .197, CI95[-.061, .297].  
Childhood harshness. Harshness was marginally positively associated with utilitarian 
responding, consistent with Study 3a, and significantly positively associated with deontological 
responding. When controlling for childhood unpredictability, adult income, age, gender, and the 
other parameter, childhood harshness significantly positively predicted both parameters: U 
parameter, b = .13, SE = .06, t(429) = 2.16, p = .031, CI95[.012, .250]; D parameter, b = .18, SE = 
.06, t(429) = 3.08, p = .002, CI95[.066, .296]. Thus, people who experienced relatively more 
resource scarcity in childhood were more likely to both reject harm and maximize overall 
outcomes in sacrificial dilemmas.  
Next, we explored whether current economic unpredictability interacted with childhood 
harshness to predict moral dilemma decision making. In separate regression analyses, we 
regressed each parameter onto childhood harshness (standardized), condition (technology 
fails/control=0, current unpredictability/experimental=1), and their interaction, controlling for 
the other parameter. As in Study 3a, we saw evidence of a marginal trend for the interaction on 
the D parameter, b = .20, SE = .11, t(431) = 1.80, p = .072, CI95[-.018, .408]. However, this 
effect did not hold controlling for childhood unpredictability, adult income, age, gender, and the 
other parameter, b = .17, SE = .11, t(427) = 1.61, p = .108, CI95[-.038, .379]. Moreover, 
consistent with Study 3a, childhood harshness and current unpredictability did not interact to 
predict the U parameter, b = -.11, SE = .11, t(431) = -0.97, p = .335, CI95[-.321, .109]. This held 
when additionally controlling for childhood unpredictability, adult income, age, and gender, b = -
.10, SE = .11, t(427) = -.86, p = .388, CI95[-.310, .120].
7 
 
7A random effects meta-analyses across Studies 3a and 3b (N = 579), correcting for differences in sample sizes 
(Lipsey & Wilson, 2001; Wilson, 2010) revealed that the current unpredictability by childhood unpredictability 
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 Discussion. Study 3b replicated the key pattern in Studies 1, 2, and 3a: people who 
experienced more unpredictable childhood environments were less likely to both reject harm and 
maximize outcomes in sacrificial dilemmas. Conversely, childhood harshness was positively 
associated with utilitarian and deontological response tendencies. That is, people who 
experienced harsher childhood environments tended to both reject harm and maximize outcomes 
more often. Contrary to predictions, the current economic unpredictability manipulation failed to 
amplify the relationship between childhood unpredictability and moral response tendencies (see 
Footnote 6), nor did the unpredictability manipulation interact with harshness or directly impact 
dilemma responses. By replicating these null effects across two preregistered studies, we are 
fairly confident in concluding that current environmental unpredictability did not impact 
dilemma judgments, suggesting that perhaps the processes underlying moral dilemma responses 
are largely insensitive to immediate conditions of environmental unpredictability. 
Consistent with that idea, response plasticity to present environmental cues should be 
selective because there are inherent costs to such shifts (see DeWitt et al., 1998, for a review). 
First, flexibility requires metabolic energy allotted to collecting data from the environment. 
Second, data collected from the environment could be inconsistent with broader ecological 
conditions, and therefore misleading, such that adjusting to an environment in which one does 
not actually reside would be disadvantageous. Because a complex confluence of socioemotional 
individual differences calibrated in early childhood contributes to moral dilemma decisions, one 
minute’s worth of information about the current environment may not be sufficient to shift 
 
interaction was not significant for the U parameter, b= -.03, Z = -.71, p = .478, CI95[-.113,.053], which did not vary 
in magnitude across studies, Q(1) = .06, p = .814, or the D parameter, b= -.05, Z = -.70, p = .485, CI95[-.172,.082], 
which did not vary in magnitude across studies. Likewise, there was no metanalytic main effect of current 
unpredictability on the U parameter, b= -.06, Z = -1.54, p = .123, CI95[-.148,.018], which did not vary in magnitude 
across studies, Q(1) = .35, p = .554, or the D parameter, b= -.005, Z = -.06, p = .950, CI95[-.171,.160], which varied 
in magnitude across studies, Q(1) = 4.03, p = .045.  
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people’s tendencies to avoid harm and maximize outcomes. In the next study, we examined 
whether individual differences related to trusting, empathizing with, and supporting others 
account for the consistent finding that childhood unpredictability is associated with less harm 
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Study 4 (preregistered, aspredicted.org, #27262) tested whether other-oriented individual 
differences would account for the relationships between childhood unpredictability and weaker 
tendencies to avoid harm and maximize outcomes on sacrificial moral dilemmas. Unpredictable 
childhood environments are associated with social functioning optimized for garnering resources 
for the self at the cost of others—such as reduced empathy, a general distrust of others, belief 
that the world is dangerous, and poorer quality relationships with close others (e.g., Jonason et 
al., 2016, 2017; Zhu et al., 2018, 2019). Hence, we expected that empathic concern, trust, and 
relationship network quality would be negatively associated with childhood unpredictability, 
whereas belief in a dangerous world would be positively associated with childhood 
unpredictability.  
Furthermore, concern for individuals and the group predict deontological and utilitarian 
response tendencies (e.g., Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Conway et al., 2018; Reynolds & 
Conway, 2018), such that we expected trust in others and relationship quality to be positively 
associated and belief in a dangerous world to be negatively associated with both parameters. 
Empathic concern more often predicts deontological than utilitarian response tendencies (e.g., 
Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Conway et al., 2018; Reynolds & Conway, 2018), and we expected 
a similar pattern of associations here. Accordingly, we expected reduced empathic concern, a 
general distrust of others, belief that the world is dangerous, and poorer quality relationships with 
close others to at least partially mediate the relationships between childhood unpredictability and 
lower deontological and utilitarian concerns. We also explored whether these variables 
accounted for any associations between childhood harshness and dilemma responses and whether 
mediation results hold above and beyond personality variables. 
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Participants. To detect the hypothesized indirect effects (with predicted effect sizes of 
.26 for each path in the mediational chain, based on the previous studies), an a priori power 
analysis indicated that we needed 162 people to reach 80% power (Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007). 
To increase power, particularly given the potential for high levels of data exclusion due to 
inattentive responding, we collected data from 321 participants via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
As preregistered, we decided a priori to exclude participants who failed an attention check (n = 
69; Oppenheimer et al., 2009) or failed to answer all dilemmas (n = 20). Our final sample 
included 250 individuals (121 females, 128 males; Mage = 34.61, SD = 10.16; 171 White, 41 
Black, 26 Hispanic or Latino, 6 Asian, 4 Native American, 3 Pacific Islander, 1 ‘mixed’).  
Procedure and materials. As before, participants responded to the moral dilemma 
battery, measures of childhood unpredictability (M = 3.31, SD = 1.76, α = .95), childhood 
harshness (items standardized and combined, SD = .83, α = .85), and demographics, including 
adult income (M = 4.40, SD = 1.74). New to this study, participants also completed measures of 
empathic concern, general trust, belief in a dangerous world, social support quality, and the Big 5 
personality traits. 
Empathic concern. Participants responded to seven items (Davis, 1983), such as When I 
see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective toward them and Sometimes I 
don't feel sorry for other people when they are having problems (reversed), on scales from 1 
(does not describe me well) to 5 (describes me very well). We averaged scores across items, such 
that higher scores represent more empathic concern (M = 3.70, SD = .78, α = .80). 
General trust. Participants responded to the six items of the General Trust Scale 
(Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994), such as People are basically honest and People are 
trustworthy, on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). We averaged scores 
35 
 
across items, such that higher scores represent more trusting in general (M = 4.82, SD = 1.20, α = 
.92).  
Belief in a dangerous world. Participants responded to 12 items of the Belief in a 
Dangerous World scale (Altemeyer, 1988), which includes items such as There are many 
dangerous people in our society who will attack someone out of pure meanness, for no reason at 
all and If a person takes a few sensible precautions, nothing bad will happen to him. We do not 
live in a dangerous world (reversed) on scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
We averaged scores across items, such that higher scores represent stronger beliefs that the world 
is dangerous (M = 4.06, SD = .99, α = .84). 
Close relationship support quality. Participants responded to 15 items of an adapted 
short form of the Network of Relationships Questionnaire (Furman & Buhrmester, 1985) to 
measure social support provisions in “relationships with family, parents, friends, and your 
romantic partner—close others” on scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
Sample items include These people help me figure out or fix things and We often argue with each 
other (reversed). We averaged scores across items, such that higher scores represent better 
relationship quality (M = 4.65, SD = .88, α = .85). 
Personality. To control for personality in the mediation analyses, participants responded 
to the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (Gosling et al., 2003). We included each of the Big Five 
traits as control measures in secondary analyses: openness to experience (M = 4.93, SD = 1.25, α 
= .33), conscientiousness (M = 5.16, SD = 1.27, α = .45), extraversion (M = 3.77, SD = 1.50, α = 





We tested whether childhood unpredictability was negatively and harshness was 
positively (or not related) to deontological and utilitarian dilemma responding. We also 
examined how empathic concern, general trust, belief in a dangerous world, and relationship 
support quality were related to the D and U parameters and to childhood unpredictability and 
harshness. Finally, we examined whether these individual differences in social functioning 
mediated the associations between childhood ecological factors and moral dilemma response 
tendencies.  
Childhood unpredictability. Consistent with predictions and replicating the previous 
studies, childhood unpredictability was negatively related to both PD parameters (see Table 4). 
People who experienced relatively more unpredictability in early childhood demonstrated less 
harm aversion and outcome maximization. These associations held when controlling for 
childhood harshness, adult income, age, gender, and the other parameter: D parameter, b = -.16, 
SE = .03, t(242) = -4.77, p < .001, CI95[-.222, -.092], and U parameter, b = -.10, SE = .04, t(242) 
= -2.84, p = .005, CI95[-.169, -.031].  
Childhood harshness. Consistent with Study 3b, early ecological harshness was 
positively associated with both the D and U parameters. People with access to fewer versus more 
resources during childhood more often rejected harm and maximized overall wellbeing. When 
controlling for childhood unpredictability, adult income, age, gender, and the other parameter, 
the association between harshness and the D parameter dropped to a marginal trend, b = .12, SE 
= .07, t(242) = 1.75, p = .082, CI95[-.016, .265], but the association between harshness and the U 
parameter remained significant, b = .17, SE = .07, t(242) = 2.24, p = .026, CI95[.020, .309].  
Individual differences in social functioning. Next, we assessed whether the individual 
difference measures were associated with the PD parameters. Empathic concern was 
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significantly positively associated with the D parameter as expected, but also positively 
associated with the U parameter, contrary to predictions but consistent with some work (e.g., 
Maranges et al., 2020a, 2020b). Unexpectedly, general trust in others was negatively associated 
with both parameters and belief in a dangerous world was unrelated to either parameter. As 
predicted, relationship support quality was significantly positively related to both parameters. To 
summarize, higher levels of empathic concern and relationship support quality, and lower levels 
of trust, were associated with a tendency to reject harm and a tendency to favor actions that 
increase the overall wellbeing of others. 
We then assessed whether the individual difference measures were associated with 
childhood unpredictability and harshness. Empathic concern and relationship support quality, but 
not the other individual differences, were significantly negatively associated with childhood 
unpredictability. This suggests people who experienced more unpredictable childhood 
environments were less concerned about the wellbeing of others and experienced less supportive 
close relationships. General trust in others, but no other individual difference, was significantly 
negatively associated with childhood harshness: the more resource scarce people’s childhood 
environments, the less they trust other people generally. 
Mediation analyses. As preregistered, we tested whether the candidate mediators (i.e., 
empathic concern, general trust, belief in a dangerous world, and relationship support quality) 
accounted for significant indirect variance in the relationships between childhood 
unpredictability and the moral dilemma parameters. We conducted two separate 10,000 
bootstrapping resample mediation analyses using Model 4 in the PROCESS Macro for SPSS 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2004)—one for the utilitarian parameter and one for the deontology 
parameter. In each analysis, putative mediators were tested simultaneously to account for their 
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shared variance. We also conducted parallel analyses to explore potential mediation of the links 
between childhood harshness and the parameters. Finally, we reran each analysis including 
control variables.  
Childhood unpredictability. Regarding utilitarian response tendencies, less empathic 
concern, b = -.03, SE = .01, CI95[-.065, -.017], and less close relationship support quality, b = -
.04, SE = .01, CI95[-.070, -.014], mediated the relationship between childhood unpredictability 
and the U parameter (see Figure 1). Neither trust in others, b = -.02, SE = .01, CI95[-.040, .003], 
nor belief in a dangerous world, b = .00, SE = .01, CI95[-.010, -.016], mediated this link (see 
Figure 1). Controlling for childhood harshness, adult income, age, gender, the big five 
personality traits, and the other parameter: the effect of unpredictability on utilitarian responding 
through empathic concern became marginal, b = -.01, SE = .01, CI95[-.024, .002]; through 
relationship support quality remained significant, b = -.01, SE = .01, CI95[-.040, -.002]; through 
trust became significant, b = -.02, SE = .01, CI95[-.040, -.001]; through belief in a dangerous 
world remained nonsignificant, b = -.00, SE = .01, CI95[-.014, .008]. 
Similar mediation effects emerged for deontological response tendencies. As predicted, 
less empathic concern, b = -.04, SE = .01, CI95[-.065, -.017], and less close relationship support 
quality, b = -.03, SE = .01, CI95[-.054, -.004], mediated the relationship between childhood 
unpredictability and the D parameter (see Figure 2). Neither trust in others, b = -.01, SE = .01, 
CI95[-.032, .001], nor belief in a dangerous world, b = .00, SE = .00, CI95[-.001, .012], mediated 
this link. Controlling for childhood harshness, adult income, age, gender, the big five personality 
traits, and the other parameter: the effect of unpredictability on deontological responding through 
empathic concern became marginal, b = -.01, SE = .01, CI95[-.023, .002]; through relationship 
support quality became nonsignificant, b = -.00, SE = .01, CI95[-.017, .011]; through trust 
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remained nonsignificant, b = -.00, SE = .01, CI95[-.025, .011]; through belief in a dangerous 
world remained nonsignificant, b = -.00, SE = .00, CI95[-.012, .005]. Thus, people who 
experienced relatively unpredictable childhood environments experienced less empathic concern, 
less supportive close relationships, and (to a degree) less trust in others, which partially 
accounted for less concern about rejecting harm to and maximizing outcomes for others.  
Childhood harshness. Childhood harshness was associated with higher levels of 
utilitarian responding through less trust in others, b = .11, SE = .03, CI95[.056, .185], but not 
through empathic concern, b = .03, SE = .02, CI95[-.003, .082], relationship support quality, b = 
.02, SE = .02, CI95[-.017, .062], or belief in a dangerous world, b = -.01, SE = .02, CI95[-.050, 
.015]. This pattern held when controlling for childhood unpredictability, adult income, age, 
gender, the big five personality traits, and the other parameter: there remained a significant 
indirect effect via trust in others, b = .05, SE = .03, CI95[.003, .115], but not via empathic 
concern, b = .00, SE = .01, CI95[-.012, .026]; relationship support quality, b = .00, SE = .01, 
CI95[-.016, .035]; or belief in a dangerous world, b = .00, SE = .01, CI95[-.019, .029]. 
A similar pattern emerged for the deontological parameter, such that childhood harshness 
predicted harm aversion on moral dilemmas through less trust in others, b = .08, SE = .03, 
CI95[.030, .151], but not through empathic concern, b = .04, SE = .02, CI95[-.004, .090]; 
relationship support quality, b = .02, SE = .02, CI95[-.017, .055]; or belief in a dangerous world, b 
= -.01, SE = .01, CI95[-.039, .008]. This held when controlling for childhood unpredictability, 
adult income, age, gender, the big five personality traits, and the other parameter: trust in others, 
b = .01, SE = .03, CI95[-.041, .069], but not through empathic concern, b = .00, SE = .01, CI95[-
.011, .026]; relationship support quality, b = .00, SE = .01, CI95[-.009, .017]; or belief in a 
dangerous world, b = .00, SE = .01, CI95[-.015, .017]. In sum, people who experienced higher 
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levels of childhood harshness experienced less trust in others, which was associated with less 
harm aversion and less outcome maximization across moral dilemmas. Notably, however, 
harshness was associated with higher (not lower) levels of harm aversion and outcome 
maximization, thus rendering the results of this mediation analysis difficult to interpret.  
Discussion 
Replicating Studies 1, 2, 3a, and 3b, we found that people who experienced more 
unpredictable childhood environments made fewer deontological and utilitarian moral dilemma 
decisions. Furthermore, mediation analyses suggested that empathic concern and relationship 
support quality partially accounted for these relationships: people with relatively unpredictable 
childhoods experienced lower empathic concern and lower quality close relationships, which in 
turn predicted weaker tendencies to avoid harm and maximize outcomes on moral dilemmas. In 
contrast, childhood harshness was associated with increased deontological and utilitarian 
responding across moral dilemmas, consistent with Study 3 and the idea that resource scarcity 
encourages concern for others. This work adds to a growing body of literature underscoring the 
importance of dissociating the early ecological factors of unpredictability and harshness, which 
contribute to complex moral decision making in different ways. Nonetheless, it may be important 
to consider a wider range of features characterizing childhood ecologies than examined so far – 
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Childhood unpredictability is associated with lower utilitarian response tendencies through lower 
empathic concern and close relationship support quality, but not through general trust in others 
or belief in a dangerous world, Study 4. Solid lines indicate significant effects, dotted lines 
indicate non-significant effects; significant mediation pathways in black, non-significant 







Childhood unpredictability is associated with lower deontological response tendencies through 
lower empathic concern and close relationship support quality, but not through general trust in 
others or belief in a dangerous world, Study 4. Solid lines indicate significant effects, dotted lines 
indicate non-significant effects; significant mediation pathways in black, non-significant 






 Studies 1-4 established that childhood unpredictability (but not harshness) is associated 
with reduced harm rejection and outcome maximization on sacrificial dilemmas, but those 
studies were somewhat limited by a reliance on measures that may fall short of fully tapping the 
constructs of unpredictability and harshness. Therefore, in Study 5 we created and used new 
measures to assess unpredictability and harshness. The unpredictability measure not only 
included a more comprehensive set of items, but also differentiated between sources of 
unpredictability involving social (e.g., neighbors, teachers, peers) and nonsocial or physical (e.g., 
weather, neighborhood structure, financial) features of the environment. The harshness measure 
also included a more comprehensive set of items tapping a number of different sources of 
ecological harshness (e.g., lack of food, clothing, electricity) that go beyond family income. This 
allowed for a stronger test of whether childhood harshness plays a role in adult moral dilemma 
decision making.  
We expected negative associations between childhood social unpredictability and both 
harm-rejection (deontological) and outcome-maximizing (utilitarian) moral dilemma responses. 
We expected a similar pattern for childhood physical unpredictability. Additionally, we expected 
childhood harshness to be either positively or not significantly associated with deontological and 
utilitarian response patterns. In addition, Study 5 aimed to elucidate the role of potential 
confounds, namely, religiosity, political orientation, Big 5 personality traits8, and social 
desirability in the association between childhood ecological factors and moral decision making. 
Specifically, we address whether the associations between childhood unpredictability and 
 
8We used a longer and psychometrically stronger measure than in Study 4 (Lang et al., 2011; Hahn et al., 2012). 
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utilitarian and deontological responses (a) hold above and beyond or (b) are mediated by these 
individual differences.  
 Participants. We decided a priori to collect data from at least 500 people via Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk in a single wave. This is based on (a) Fritz & MacKinnon’s (2007) analysis for 
a small effect size for X → M and M → X, which indicated that 412 people will be needed to 
reach 80% power, (b) our having found small-to-medium effects in a prior mediation study, (c) 
an aim to increase our power from 80%, and (d) due to expected exclusions based on prior 
studies. We collected data from 501 people. As preregistered, we excluded participants who 
failed one or more of two attention checks (n = 268; Oppenheimer et al., 2009) or failed to 
answer all dilemmas (n = 10, 3 of whom also failed attention check). Our final sample included 
220 individuals (117 females, 99 males, 1 other; Mage = 31.71, SD = 10.68; 151 White, 31 
Hispanic or Latino, 18 Black, 7 Asian, 7 Native American, 4 Pacific Islander, 1 Bengali, 1 
Middle Eastern). The reduced sample afforded above 80% power to detect small-to-medium 
effects in exploratory mediation analyses (Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007) and above 90% power to 
detect small-to-medium effects in our primary correlation and regression analyses (Faul et al., 
2007). 
Procedure and materials. As before, participants responded to the PD moral dilemma 
battery, measures of childhood unpredictability and harshness, and demographics, including 
adult income (M = 4.50, SD = 1.83). We included new, extended measures of childhood social 
and physical unpredictability, as well as of childhood harshness (see Supplemental materials for 
items and their development). Participants also responded to measures of religiosity, political 
orientation, personality, and social desirability.  
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 Childhood social unpredictability. Participants responded to 24 items, including the 
original eight (Mittal et al., 2015; Young et al., 2018), capturing the extent to which their 
childhood environments were characterized by unpredictability on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree) scale. Sample new items include My parents went through multiple separations 
or divorces, My family often moved homes and schools when I was a child, and I often did not 
know what to expect from other students at school. We averaged scores across items, and higher 
scores represent more unpredictable social environments (M = 3.38, SD = 1.38, α = .95). 
 Childhood physical unpredictability. Participants reported the unpredictability of their 
physical childhood environments by responding to 12 items on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree) scale. Sample items include I was never certain where it was safe to play, There 
was a lot of change in the structure (e.g., buildings, signs) of my neighborhood, and I 
experienced extreme, unexpected weather events when I was a kid (e.g., volcano erupting, 
earthquake, tsunami). We averaged scores across items, and higher scores represent more 
unpredictable physical environments (M = 3.18, SD = 1.65, α = .95). 
 Childhood harshness. Participants responded to 28 items total: 27 items, including the 
original three (Mittal et al., 2015; Young et al., 2018), captured the extent to which their 
childhood environments were characterized by scarcity (vs. abundance) of resources on a 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree; M = 3.75, SD = 1.18) scale. As in the prior studies and 
original measure, one item asked about income on an 8-point scale (M = 4.65, SD = 1.71). 
Sample new items include My family was strained financially, Sometimes we lost access to 
heating, water, or electricity because of overdue bills, and My caregivers typically got me any 
food I wanted from the grocery store (reversed). For the final composite, which includes items 
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on different scales, we standardized and averaged across items, and higher scores represent 
harsher childhood environments (SD = .61, α = .94). 
 Religiosity. Participants responded to the ten-item Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith 
Questionnaire (Plante & Boccaccini, 1997) on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree). Sample items include My religious faith is extremely important to me and My faith 
impacts many of my decisions. We averaged scores across items, and higher scores represent 
more religiosity (M = 4.34, SD = 1.93, α = .98). 
 Political orientation. Participants responded to the question How would you describe 
your political orientation? on a 1 (extremely liberal) to 7 (extremely conservative) scale with 
additional options I haven’t thought much about this (n = 6) and Libertarian/none of these (n = 
11). Removing the latter two options, higher scores represent relatively more conservative 
political orientations (M = 4.59, SD = 2.30). Hence, in analyses, we refer to this construct as 
political conservativism. 
 Personality. Participants responded to the 15-item Big Five Inventory (Lang et al., 2011; 
Hahn et al., 2012). Participants rated their agreement with “I see myself as someone who…” 
statements on 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale. We averaged across three items 
to calculate each trait: openness to experience (e.g., is original, comes up with new ideas; M = 
5.46, SD = .94, α = .64), conscientiousness (e.g., does a thorough job; M = 5.14, SD = .95, α = 
.43), extraversion (e.g., is outgoing, sociable; M = 4.14, SD = 1.08, α = .52), agreeableness (e.g., 
has a forgiving nature; M = 5.08, SD = .94, α = .36), and neuroticism (e.g., worries a lot; M = 
4.09, SD = 1.24, α = .62). 
 Social desirability. Participants responded to the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability 
Scale short form, containing 13 True-False items that capture the tendency to self-report in 
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positively biased ways, at the cost of honesty (Reynolds, 1982). Sample items include No matter 
who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener and There have been occasions when I took 
advantage of someone (reversed). We summed positively biased responses to create a social 
desirability score for each participant (M = 6.25, SD = 2.88, α = .69). 
Results  
 We tested whether childhood unpredictability predicted less harm aversion (D parameter) 
and outcome maximizing (U parameter). To examine whether social, physical, or both types of 
childhood unpredictability contribute to moral dilemma decisions in adulthood, we examined 
them separately. Nonetheless, it is important to note that childhood social and physical 
unpredictability were highly correlated, suggesting that people who experienced highly 
unpredictable social environments also experienced highly unpredictable physical environments 
(see Table 5). We also tested whether childhood harshness was related to the parameters. As in 
prior studies, harshness was moderately associated with social unpredictability, and new to this 
study, with physical unpredictability. Also new to this study, we examined whether the 
associations between childhood unpredictability and harshness and moral dilemma response 
tendencies held above and beyond potential confounds (religiosity, political orientation, Big 5 
personality traits, and social desirability). Finally, we explored whether these potential confounds 
may fall in the causal chain linking childhood unpredictability and harshness and moral dilemma 
response tendencies via mediation analyses. 
Regression analyses. As preregistered, we tested whether the associations among 
childhood social and physical unpredictability and harshness and the PD parameters hold not 
only controlling for demographic variables as in past studies but also potential confounds—
religiosity, political orientation, personality, and social desirability. As preregistered, we 
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examined zero-order correlations in a first step and included in subsequent regression analyses 
only those predictors demonstrating significant or marginal associations with the parameters (p < 
.10). Religiosity and political conservativism were negatively associated with the U parameter, 
whereas conscientiousness was positively associated. Conservativism, extroversion, and 
neuroticism were negatively associated with the D parameter, whereas conscientiousness, 
agreeableness, and social desirability were positively associated. People who experienced 
relatively more unpredictable social and physical environments in childhood also reported higher 
levels of religiosity, conservativism, extroversion, and neuroticism, as well as lower levels of 
conscientiousness and agreeableness. People who experienced harsher childhood environments 
also reported higher neuroticism. 
Childhood social unpredictability. Consistent with predictions, and replicating the 
previous studies, childhood social unpredictability was negatively related to both PD parameters, 
such that people who experienced relatively more unpredictability were less likely to reject harm 
and maximize outcomes (see Table 5). These associations held when controlling for childhood 
harshness, adult income, age, gender, and the other parameter: D parameter, b = -.38, SE = .06, 
t(210) = -6.41, p < .001, CI95[-.495, -.262], U parameter, b = -.36, SE = .06, t(242) = -5.92, p < 
.001, CI95[-.480, -.240].  
Likewise, when controlling for political conservativism, extroversion, neuroticism, 
conscientiousness, agreeableness, social desirability and the other parameter, childhood social 
unpredictability continued to negatively predict the D parameter, b = -.18, SE = .05, t(191) = -
3.50, p < .001, CI95[-.284, -.079]. When controlling for religiosity, political conservativism, and 
conscientiousness, and the other parameter, childhood social unpredictability still negatively 
predicted the U parameter, b = -.14, SE = .06, t(194) = -2.51, p = .013, CI95[-.247, -.030]. 
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Childhood physical unpredictability. Consistent with predictions, childhood physical 
unpredictability was negatively related to both PD parameters, such that people who experienced 
relatively more unpredictability in their physical environment were less likely to reject harm and 
maximize outcomes (see Table 5). These associations held when controlling for childhood 
harshness, adult family income, age, gender, and the other parameter: D parameter, b = -.34, SE 
= .05, t(210) = -7.24, p < .001, CI95[-.431, -.247], and U parameter, b = -.36, SE = .05, t(210) = -
7.83, p < .001, CI95[-.446, -.266].
9  
When controlling for political conservativism, extroversion, neuroticism, 
conscientiousness, agreeableness, social desirability and the other parameter, childhood physical 
unpredictability continued to negatively predict the D parameter, b = -.21, SE = .05, t(191) = -
4.58, p < .001, CI95[-.297, -.118]. When controlling for religiosity, political conservativism, and 
conscientiousness, and the other parameter, childhood physical unpredictability still negatively 
predicted the U parameter, b = -.21, SE = .05, t(194) = -4.27, p < .001, CI95[-.303, -.112].  
Childhood harshness. Replicating Studies 1 and 2, but not Studies 3 and 4, ecological 
harshness in childhood was not associated with either the D or the U parameter. However, when 
controlling for childhood social and physical unpredictability, adult income, age, gender, and the 
other parameter, harshness became a significant predictor of higher levels of both dilemma 
response tendencies: D parameter, b = .37, SE = .13, t(209) = 2.87, p = .005, CI95[.115, .622], U 
parameter, b = .43, SE = .13, t(209) = 3.35, p = .001, CI95[.175, .676]. Thus, consistent with 
Studies 3 and 4, the fewer resources people had when growing up, the more they rejected harm 
and maximized outcomes. 
 
9Given the high correlation and multicollinearity between childhood social and physical unpredictability and 
subsequent interpretability issues, we relegate analyses that include both as predictors to the supplemental materials. 
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When controlling for political conservativism, extroversion, neuroticism, 
conscientiousness, agreeableness, social desirability, and the other parameter, however, 
childhood harshness no longer significantly predicted the D parameter, b = -.05, SE = .11, t(191) 
= -0.45, p = .653, CI95[-.265, .166]. However, when controlling for religiosity, political 
conservativism, and conscientiousness, and the other parameter, childhood harshness was no 
longer associated with the U parameter, b = -.01, SE = .11, t(194) = -.10, p = .920, CI95[-.228, 
.206].  
Mediation analyses. As preregistered, we tested whether the candidate mediators 
(religiosity, political conservativism, Big 5 personality traits, and social desirability) accounted 
for significant indirect variance in the relationships between childhood environments and the PD 
parameters. In a first step, we tested whether each mediator separately carried significant indirect 
variance between social unpredictability, physical unpredictability, and harshness, and each PD 
parameter in separate 10,000 bootstrapping resample mediation analyses using Model 4 in the 
PROCESS Macro for SPSS (Preacher & Hayes, 2004).10 In a second step, we included 
significant mediators from step one in a simultaneous mediation model to account for their 
shared variance.  
Childhood social unpredictability. In the first step, only agreeableness accounted for 
significant indirect variance between childhood social unpredictability and the D parameter, b = -
.04, SE = .01, CI95[-.078, -.021], an effect that remained significant when entering the other Big 5 
personality traits simultaneously, b = -.04, SE = .01, CI95[-.073, -.013]. People who experienced 
 
10For personality traits, we tested them both individually and simultaneously (i.e., entered all five personality 




more unpredictable social environments as children were less agreeable, and this contributed to 
less concern about rejecting harm. 
Religiosity and political conservativism each individually accounted for significant 
indirect variance between childhood social unpredictability and the U parameter. Together in the 
same model, religiosity, b = -.05, SE = .02, CI95[-.092, -.025], but not conservativism, b = -.01, 
SE = .02, CI95[-.056, .023], mediated the relationship between childhood social unpredictability 
and utilitarian response tendencies. That is, controlling for conservativism, people who 
experienced more unpredictable social environments as children were more religious, and this 
contributed to less outcome maximization on moral dilemmas. 
Childhood physical unpredictability. In the first step, religiosity and agreeableness each 
individually accounted for significant indirect variance between childhood physical 
unpredictability and the D parameter. Together in the same model, both agreeableness, b = -.03, 
SE = .01, CI95[-.059, -.014] and religiosity, b = .03, SE = .02, CI95[.002, .068] mediated the 
relationship between childhood physical unpredictability and deontological response tendencies 
in different directions. Effects were relatively weaker with the other Big 5 personality traits 
entered simultaneously: agreeableness, b = -.02, SE = .01, CI95[-.051, -.005], religiosity, b = .03, 
SE = .02, CI95[-.003, .068].  
Only religiosity accounted for significant indirect variance between childhood physical 
unpredictability and the U parameter: b = -.05, SE = .01, CI95[-.079, -.021]. In sum, people who 
experienced more unpredictability in their physical environments were more religious, which 
was associated with higher levels of harm aversion and lower levels of outcome maximization. 
However, people from unpredictable environments were also less agreeable, which in turn 
predicted less harm aversion. 
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Childhood harshness. None of the individual differences accounted for significant 
indirect variance between childhood physical unpredictability and the D or U parameters (see 
Supplemental Materials). 
Discussion 
 Study 5 employed new extended measures designed to more fully capture the 
unpredictability and harshness of childhood environments. We replicated the finding of the five 
prior studies that people whose childhood ecologies were characterized by more unpredictability 
were less concerned about rejecting harm to and increasing overall wellbeing for others. Without 
controlling for other ecological factors and demographics, childhood harshness was not 
associated with either response tendency, replicating the first two studies: whether people lacked 
resources in childhood was unassociated with their moral dilemma decision making.  
 This study moved beyond the prior studies to include broader (beyond social) elements of 
childhood ecologies. When those nonsocial, physical features of the childhood environment were 
relatively unpredictable, people displayed less concern about harm aversion and outcome 
maximization. Social and physical unpredictability were highly correlated, such that people who 
reported experiencing high levels of social unpredictability also reported experiencing high 
levels of physical unpredictability. One possibility is that unreliable families, neighbors, and 
peers were more likely to inhabit or were at least unable to buffer children from more chaotic 
physical environments, such as changing neighborhood structure.  
 With respect to the role of religiosity, political conservativism, personality, and social 
desirability, regression analyses suggest the associations between ecological factors and moral 
decision making are robust to these potential confounds. Mediation analyses further suggest the 
possibility that two individual differences may fall in a causal chain linking early developmental 
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ecological conditions to moral dilemma decision making in adulthood: agreeableness and 
religiosity. The more unpredictable people’s childhood environments were, the less agreeable 
they tended to be, and this contributed to lower levels of harm aversion across moral dilemmas. 
This fits with other work that finds childhood unpredictability is associated with low 
agreeableness in adulthood (e.g., Chen et al., 2017), which may be an adaptive strategy to the 
extent that one cannot afford to invest in other people in an unpredictable environment (e.g., Del 
Giudice, 2016; Figueredo et al., 2007; Gladden et al., 2008).  
 Greater unpredictability was also associated with higher levels of religiosity, which 
contributed to less outcome maximizing across moral dilemmas. This pattern is consistent with 
research suggesting that religiosity serves as a buffer to the effects of challenging childhood 
ecologies (e.g., Henderson, 2016) but contrasts with work that suggests lower levels of 
religiosity are responses to early unpredictability (e.g., Gladden et al.., 2008, 2009). Moreover, 
prior work has similarly demonstrated that religiosity contributes to less outcome maximizing 
(e.g., Reynolds et al., 2019). Thus, over and above potential confounds, childhood 
unpredictability is linked with moral decisions in adulthood, although findings are also consistent 







Correlations Among Variables, Study 5. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Utilitarian PD 
Parameter 
—               
2. Deontology PD 
Parameter 
.26*** —              
3. Childhood Social 
Unpredictability 
-.37** -.42*** —             
4. Childhood Physical 
Unpredictability 
-.49** -.47*** .84*** —            
5. Childhood 
Harshness 
.02 -.06 .54*** .36*** —           
6. Religiosity -.36*** -.07 .27*** .42*** -.06 —          
7. Political 
Conservativism 
-.27*** -.23** .34*** .41*** .03 .53*** — 
 
       
8. Openness .02 .08 .09 .10 -.00 .07 -.12† —        
9. Conscientiousness .15* .30*** -.31*** -.19** -.11 .12† -.12† .27*** —       
10. Extroversion -.10 -.15* .16* .20** -.04 .16* .02 .21** .05 —      
11. Agreeableness .09 .34*** -.23*** -.24*** -.05 .03 -.16* .30*** .53*** .00 —     
12. Neuroticism -.01 -.14* .22** .12† .26*** -.30*** -.20** .05 -.36*** -.12† .21** —    
13. Social Desirability -.01 .25*** -.11 -.02 -.07 .22** .10 .12† .29*** .07 .37*** -.34*** —   
14. Adult income -.02 .01 -.13† -.02 -.37*** .17* .08 -.15* .02 .02 -.04 -29*** .09 —  
15. Gender (f=1, m=2) -.05 -.11 .08 .10 -.04 .07 .16* -.13† -.04 -.07 -.13† -.22** -.06 .16* — 
16. Age -.07 -.00 .07 .14* -.04 .27** .23** -.13† .07 -.07 -.01 -28*** .10 .18** .19** 





We conducted a meta-analysis across all six studies to quantify the effect of childhood 
social unpredictability and of childhood harshness on moral dilemma responses (for details and 
syntax see https://mason.gmu.edu/~dwilsonb/ma.html). Specifically, we conducted two random 
effects meta-analyses across all samples (N = 1,503), correcting for differences in sample sizes 
(Lipsey & Wilson, 2001; Wilson, 2010). For unpredictability, there was a significant medium-
sized effect of childhood unpredictability on the U parameter, b = -.27, Z = -5.12, p < .001, CI95[-
.383, -.178], which varied in magnitude across studies, Q(5) = 25.07, p < .001. Likewise, there 
was a significant medium effect of childhood unpredictability on the D parameter, b = -.30, Z = -
4.67, p < .001, CI95[-.408, -.175], which also varied in magnitude across studies, Q(5) = 32.83, p 
< .001.  
Across these studies, there was no significant effect of childhood harshness on the U 
parameter, b = .06, Z = 1.29, p = .197, CI95[-.030, .145], but this effect varied in magnitude 
across studies, Q(5) = 15.64, p = .008. Likewise, there was no significant effect of childhood 
harshness on the D parameter, b = .06, Z = 1.41, p = .160, CI95[-.022, .131], but this effect varied 
in magnitude across studies, Q(5) = 11.86, p = .037. These high-powered meta-analytic results 
confirmed that childhood unpredictability, but not harshness, was associated with moral decision 
making, such that people who experienced unpredictable, versus predictable, childhoods were 
less concerned about harm to and maximization of outcomes for others on moral dilemmas. 
General Discussion 
Humans display remarkable phenotypic plasticity, developing flexibly to meet the 
demands of particular ecologies with different affordances (Sng et al., 2017). When faced with 
difficult childhood environments, people tend to develop in ways strategically aimed at helping 
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them reap the benefits, and avoid the perils, of adverse ecologies. One important aspect of the 
ecology involves its predictability—can one forecast what resources and social support one will 
have in the future? Another important aspect of the ecology is harshness—does one have 
sufficient resources to survive?  
Although both unpredictability and harshness encourage impulsivity in order to gain 
resources in the present (e.g., Griskevicius et al., 2011; Mittal & Griskevicius, 2014), their 
downstream social effects diverge: unpredictability begets a focus on the self (versus others) 
whereas harshness begets a focus on others (versus self; e.g., Barbaro & Shackelford, 2019; 
Belsky et al., 2012; Simpson et al., 2012; Stephens et al., 2007, 2011, 2012; Szepsenwol et al, 
2019). The current work elucidated how exposure to unpredictability and harshness in childhood 
shapes a central aspect of social life—morality, namely in decisions to accept harm that may or 
may not improve others’ wellbeing.  
Across six studies, people exposed to childhood unpredictability were less inclined to 
avoid harm and maximize wellbeing, whereas harshness did not reliably predict dilemma 
judgments. Moreover, individual differences thought to comprise adaptive responses to early 
ecological uncertainty accounted for the link between childhood unpredictability and patterns of 
dilemma responses (Studies 4 and 5). Specifically, people who grew up in unpredictable 
environments experienced low levels of empathic concern and less supportive close relationships 
(Study 4) and evinced disagreeable personalities (Study 5), which contributed to less concern 
about avoiding harm to and increasing wellbeing for others. 
Moving beyond a narrow focus on social environments, we also demonstrated that effects 
of childhood unpredictability extended to physical aspects of childhood environments (e.g., the 
weather, neighborhood structures; Study 5). Thus, whether unpredictability involved the 
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uncertainty of social relationships or instabilities within neighborhood environments, 
experiencing unpredictability in childhood was associated with less avoidance of harm and 
maximization of wellbeing in social dilemmas. Notably, the association between childhood 
unpredictability and deontological and utilitarian responding held above and beyond potential 
confounds, including religiosity, political orientation, the Big 5 personality traits, and social 
desirability (Study 5) and childhood harshness (Studies 1-5). These findings fit with an emerging 
picture in the behavioral ecology literature that early childhood unpredictability rather than 
resource scarcity calibrates people’s social strategies to deprioritize the interest of others (e.g., 
Barbaro & Shackelford, 2019; Belsky et al., 2012; Simpson et al., 2012; Szepsenwol et al, 2019). 
Finally, information about the current ecology’s unpredictability of resources did not 
amplify the relationship between childhood unpredictability and deontological and utilitarian 
response tendencies (Studies 3a and 3b). This suggests that perhaps the processes underlying 
complex dilemma decisions are insensitive to immediate cues in the environment given the costs 
of flexibility to potentially transient changes in resource availability (see DeWitt et al., 1998). 
Theoretical Implications  
The current work extends a growing body of research suggesting that early childhood 
environments can profoundly shape behavior in adulthood (Belsky et al., 1991). Such work 
suggests that behavior is calibrated early in development to help people face adversity 
throughout the lifespan (Del Giudice et al., 2011). While previous work has tended to focus on 
implications of childhood environments for processes immediately tied to reproduction (e.g., 
mating and parenting; e.g., Simpson et al., 2012) and health (Ehrlich et al., 2016; McDade et al., 




This research builds on prior work linking unpredictability and harshness with moral 
decisions. For example, prior work has demonstrated that both childhood unpredictability and 
harshness were associated with selfish decisions on adapted moral dilemmas (Zhu et al., 2018). 
However, those cases forced people to choose between incurring a cost to the self and making 
decisions consistent with deontological and utilitarian ethics. In contrast, we employed dilemmas 
in which harming one focal target benefits many other targets, thus disentangling harm-rejection 
and outcome-maximization responses. In doing so, our analysis reveals a different predictive 
pattern for childhood unpredictability versus harshness. Such a pattern underscores that these 
ecological factors are distinct and likely shape moral concerns in differentiable ways.  
Other work suggests that neither childhood unpredictability nor harshness predict 
cooperation in behavioral economic games (Wu et al., 2017). However, cooperative decisions 
differ from sacrificial decisions in important ways. For one, sacrificial dilemmas entail 
possibilities to prevent harm to one or multiple parties, whereas cooperative decisions entail 
possibilities to improve outcomes for oneself or multiple parties—a psychology focused on 
moral prescriptions that most dilemma responses fail to capture (Kahane et al., 2018; Conway et 
al., 2018). Another difference is that humans have a strong norm of initial cooperation in 
situations that could benefit the self and in which the alternative is to forego the gamble for 
reward altogether, even when people privately feel distrusting (Baumard et al., 2013; Dunning et 
al., 2014). Conversely, there is less consensus about the optimal decision in moral dilemmas, 
where more than one moral imperative can be brought to bear. Future work is needed to clarify 




The present work also adds to a growing body of literature demonstrating that moral 
dilemma judgments result from two separate preferences, one to avoid harm and one to 
maximize outcomes, rather than from a single preference that spans aversion to acceptance of 
harm. Indeed, if we had relied on conventional analyses that cast moral decisions as residing on a 
single continuum, it would have obscured the relationships with childhood unpredictability that 
we observed. Moreover, the current findings are informative regarding the psychological 
processes involved in sacrificial dilemmas. Although considerable evidence supports dual 
process claims that that harm-rejection judgments reflect emotional concern for victims and 
outcome-maximization judgments reflect cognitive evaluations of overall wellbeing (e.g., 
Greene, 2007), many other processes contribute as well (see Skitka & Conway, 2018). Indeed, 
we found that other-focused variables, namely, empathic concern and close relationship quality 
partially account for the relationship between unpredictability and deontological and utilitarian 
response tendencies. That is, people who experienced relatively unpredictable childhood 
environments experienced less empathic concern and poorer quality close relationships, which in 
turn predicted less harm aversion and outcome maximization. This adds to a growing body of 
work suggesting that concern for others contributes to both deontological and utilitarian 
decisions (e.g., Conway et al., 2018).  
Limitations  
 Sufficient power, preregistration, and replication increase confidence in the results 
reported here. Nonetheless, we also consider four key limitations. The first limitation is inherent 
to all moral dilemma research: interpretations of response patterns presuppose that participants 
accept a set of closed world assumptions (Bennis et al., 2010). Participants must accept that the 
harm described in the dilemma will bring about the desired outcomes and that there are no 
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feasible alternative actions. For example, if participants believe that torturing the man who has 
planted a dangerous bomb will not lead to his reporting where it is and therefore saving many 
people, they may reject harming the man for utilitarian rather than deontological reasons. In a 
similar vein, moral decision making here reflects consideration of hypothetical rather than real 
dilemmas. Although dilemma judgments appear to reflect broader patterns of moral concerns 
(Conway et al., 2018), it remains possible that decisions on real dilemmas may differ from those 
described here (see Bostyn et al., 2018). 
Second, like most dilemma work, the dilemmas employed in the current work examine 
violations of proscriptive norms—actions that harm others (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). No 
actions directly entail saving others from harm, consistent with prescriptive norms. Therefore, 
refusal to cause harm cannot be disentangled from general unwillingness to act, or tendency for 
inaction (Gawronski & Beer, 2017; Gawronski et al., 2018; Crone & Laham, 2017). Future 
research may benefit by examining how early environmental unpredictability shapes action 
versus inaction on moral dilemmas. To the extent that lower impulse control serves as an 
adaptive calibration to unpredictability (e.g., Griskevicius et al., 2011; Mittal & Griskevicius, 
2014), it is possible that people who experienced a relatively unpredictable early developmental 
environment would respond by acting, regardless of whether doing so causes or prevents harm.  
  Third, although Studies 3a and 3b included experimental manipulations of current 
unpredictability, these manipulations did not systematically impact sacrificial responses. Instead, 
we draw conclusions primarily from correlational data, which cannot speak to causation. Our 
data are not capable of showing that an unpredictable childhood environment causes people to 
reject harm and maximize outcomes less often on moral dilemmas. Manipulating childhood 
unpredictability, however, is neither ethical nor practical. Accordingly, future research may 
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employ longitudinal designs to decipher whether unpredictability experiences precede lower 
deontological and utilitarian decision making.  
 Relatedly, the current studies cannot account for genetic factors, which likely play an 
important role in accounting for the link between childhood environments and adult outcomes 
(see Belsky, 2012). One major source of unpredictability in a person’s childhood environment 
comes from close family members (with whom one shares a higher than average proportion of 
genes), such that genetic factors may confound the associations between observed phenotypic 
characteristics (e.g., Barbaro et al., 2017)—here, people’s childhood ecology and moral dilemma 
judgments. It could be that people who are low in harm-aversion and outcome-maximizing 
tendencies lead more unpredictable lives, thereby exposing their children to increased 
unpredictability while also contributing genes that promote lower concerns about harm to and 
wellbeing of others. Indeed, research shows that genetic variability in serotonin transporter genes 
influence sacrificial decisions through variation in concern for others (e.g., Crockett et al., 2010). 
Hence, future research could employ behavioral genetic methods to examine the extent to which 
genetic versus environmental factors account for the link between unpredictability in childhood 
and moral decision making in adulthood. 
Finally, our samples were drawn from largely WEIRD populations (Western, Educated, 
Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic; Henrich et al., 2010). Although we sought diversity in our 
samples by collecting data from both students and the broader population via Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk, which tends to reflect the demographics of America better than student 
samples (Huff & Tingley, 2015), less than 30% of our participants identified as non-White. 
Although some studies note considerable cross-cultural similarity in dilemma responding 
(Banerjee et al., 2010), others note some variability (e.g., Gold et al., 2014). Thus, we must 
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exercise caution in generalizing results to other populations or cultures. Notably, groups’ social 
strategies are sometimes calibrated to ecological demands that vary across nations (e.g., 
population density), as evidenced by work using data from Europe, Asia, Africa, North America, 
South America, and the Insular Pacific (Sng et al., 2017). Moreover, cultures vary with respect to 
self- versus other-focused norms: in interdependent, versus independent, cultures, people 
prioritize consideration of and acting for the group rather than the self (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991). Hence, one might expect that cultural factors such as population density or 
interdependence might amplify or buffer against effects of childhood adversity on moral decision 
making in adulthood.  
Conclusion  
 Considerable research examines the proximate psychological processes underlying 
responses to sacrificial dilemmas in which causing harm saves lives, but little is known about 
how those processes are shaped by early developmental factors. In the current work, we applied 
a behavioral ecological framework to understand how early childhood experiences shape 
people’s approach to morality in adulthood. Humans are sensitive to their early environments, 
which calibrate development in ways designed to facilitate survival and reproduction throughout 
lifespan. The current work is the first to demonstrate that early unpredictability and harshness 
have different downstream effects when it comes to a central aspect of social life—making moral 
decisions about harm to individuals and wellbeing of groups. People who experienced greater 
childhood unpredictability were less concerned about avoiding harm and maximizing outcomes, 
associations partly explained by a lack of empathy and close relationship support. In contrast, 
people who grew up with a dearth of resources were not more or less likely to reject harm or 
maximize outcomes than people who grew up with an abundance of resources. Hence, the 
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current work moves beyond the how of moral dilemma decision making and underscores the 
why: If one is uncertain about what opportunities or challenges tomorrow will bring, one may be 
less inclined to rely on other-oriented forms of moral thinking, and therefore less inclined to 
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